

Moscow, 19 January 1955

ROW IN THE KREMLIN

1. There has been a towering row in the Kremlin.
2. Khrushchev has been sharply criticizing Malenkov's policy and has in view the reinstallation of the Stalin line. He has united with Molotov for this purpose.
3. Khrushchev is demanding a new line of foreign policy in Western Europe, with regard to Tito and in handling the Satellites.
4. Khrushchev's idea is that the satellite system would break down under the weak policy in Poland, in Hungary and above all in Bulgaria. To prevent this the policy of the last 12 months must be radically altered. In Poland the state police are a long way from having the necessary total control of the country. The Communist Party there is itself sharply divided, especially over the emergence of Beirut as one of the "Polish kings". There are similar difficulties in Hungary, where the reintroduction of private agriculture has caused a back to the land movement and weakened the industrialization of the cities. In industry private work has been gaining. There are particularly difficult conditions in Bulgaria, where Interior Minister Anton Jugoff has been gaining influence. Positions hitherto occupied by persons faithful to Moscow have been thrown open, and nationalist Communism has been gaining in a manner to indicate the possibility that Bulgaria might split from Moscow in the Tito manner.

NOTE: Previous reports have offered a picture of leading personalities in the Kremlin that confirms this. Quotations from some of them are listed below:

Khrushchev: 15 April 1953: "Surprised by Malenkov's seizure of power, with which he does not concur. Will seek to use the conflict among Malenkov, Beria and Molotov so that he will emerge as the decisive figure through being the first secretary of the Central Committee. In the course of time hopes to develop this into the same position Stalin held. He has succeeded in setting up very good relations with Bulganin. For the purge he is planning needs the support of the army, which Bulganin has promised him."

Beria: 15 April 1953: "Is trying to play the different parties in the Kremlin against each other to secure his own position."

Malenkov: 6 June 1953: "His position with relation to Beria has grown weaker."

Beria: 3 June 1953: "Intriguing in the background."

11 June 1953: "Crisis in Moscow. In the middle of July the rivalry between Malenkov and Beria will come to a head."

16 June 1953: "Currently there is cooperation between Molotov and Beria."

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Malenkov: 14 August 1953: "After Beria, may get rid of Molotov, whose current foreign policy is hindering the internal consolidation of the USSR, and weakening Malenkov's position. For such a purpose needs Khrushchev, in order to use his influence with the Party and the army as a defense against counter-attack; therefore must raise Khrushchev in rank to make him the No. 3 man."

Khrushchev: 14 August 1953: "Might use the third place in the 'Troika' to the limit of his powers. Would support the ejection of Molotov out of personal ambition. Could also be dangerous to Malenkov in this connection."

Bulganin and Vassilevski: 14 August 1953: "Will not let the fluid position of Malenkov between Party and army go unused, especially in making a deal with the most important personalities. (Khrushchev?)."

Sokolovski and Zhukov: 14 August 1953: "Will seek a solution that gives the army practical influence on strategic decisions without influences from the Party."

Malenkov: 25 January 1954: "Will soon try to get rid of Molotov."

Molotov: 11 February 1954: "Supported by Mikoyan, Kaganovitch, Bulganin, Zhukov."

Malenkov and Molotov: 29 April 1954: "The political rivalry between Molotov and Malenkov dates from the war, when the Party apparatus was forced to give up its control over the army and the latter supported Molotov."

Khrushchev: 16 July 1954: "For some time his military prowess as a direct participant in the victorious battles against the Germans has been emphasized, although this really amounted to very little except as a partisan leader in the Ukraine and a member of the defense council."

27 July 1954: "Malenkov's position is weakened. He will probably be eliminated in 1955 by Khrushchev, who is already the No. 1 man. Molotov has cleverly avoided getting mixed up in the cross-fire. The last speeches before the Supreme Soviet and in Prague leave no doubt as to his influence on foreign policy. Khrushchev has so well established his position as highest functionary of the Party that he can strengthen his control over the Foreign Minister. The single dictatorship of Stalin has not developed into a Malenkov dictatorship. The disagreement with Khrushchev stands in the way."

Molotov: 8 October 1954: "If there is a further failure of the Molotov policy of reuniting and neutralizing Germany, he will be replaced by another man."

Malenkov: 21 December 1954: "He seems to have achieved good relations with Molotov. The relations between Khrushchev on the one hand and Malenkov and Molotov on the other are cooler."

Zhukov: 4 January 1955: "Commander in chief of the central army group, the so-called operative General Reserve (Briansk)."

Khrushchev: 6 January 1955: "His position with relation to Malenkov has become stronger. The quarrel is a question of time and the outcome uncertain. At the present Khrushchev seems to have the best chance."

Zhukov and Khrushchev: 10 January 1955: "Some action by Zhukov against Malenkov is to be expected this year. This action will be supported by Khrushchev."

COMMENT: It is a practical fact that in the development of the USSR, the quarrels, fights and liquidations are first of all based on political differences of opinion. In a later stage they take on the quality of greed for power and ambition among the personalities involved.

After Stalin's death only irredeemable idealists could believe that any basic alteration of the ideological system in the direction of democratization could take place. The successors were smart enough not to imperil the "unity of the Russian people" or their own power.

The political differences of opinion arose simply from the fact that Stalin's "Nyet" policy down to 1953 deprived the USSR of practically all credit as a nation willing to negotiate. In this began the differences that led to the fall of Beria.

The basic differences of opinion arise from different interpretations of the Lenin doctrine that dying capitalism makes the proletarian seizure of power inevitable. But there are two interpretations: a) A "co-existence policy" carried into the field of acts, since only in this way will a capitalist preventive war be avoided before the breakup of the West (Malenkov); b) A "co-existence policy" not carried into acts, since this will compel the breakup of the West through internal strains. (Khrushchev and Molotov).

Khrushchev is also criticizing Malenkov for his weak and faltering policy toward the satellites.